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10月21日周三
  1. Dario Amodei62

    Dario Amodei 公开回应 Nathan Calvin 对 Anthropic 竞逐超级智能、安全让位于竞争的批评,承认部分事例是失误但不同意整体论断。

    引用Nathan Calvin@_NathanCalvin

    Thank you for taking the time to respond thoroughly on a weekend. I realize that drafting legislation is difficult and some degree of iteration and response to feedback is inevitable and appropriate. However, I feel like your response is still not really engaging with the heart of my concern about Anthropic's behavior here, and it makes me think that these sorts of problems and tendencies will only resurface moving forward. I also think that now might be a good time to take a broader step back as to where we find ourselves and how Anthropic sees its role, and how external folks who care about AI safety like myself increasingly see Anthropic. (Fair warning: this response is a bit long) To explain what I mean (and at the risk of being a bit esoteric), it’s worth asking the question: what is Anthropic? How do its leaders and employees think of Anthropic’s role? Is that conception matched by how it actually behaves and impacts the world? One answer is an extremely large tech company that exists to make its employees and investors mind-bogglingly wealthy. Anthropic is sometimes described as a startup, but if Anthropic successfully IPOs at 2 trillion dollars (a number it has been reportedly targeting), it would be more valuable than Meta - which is worth 1.8 trillion. Another answer is an AI safety organization, whose core values are those of the sort laid out in the 2023 essay from Anthropic’s co-founders entitled “Core views on AI safety: When, why, what, and how.” In that essay they said that if we were in a world where alignment was hard (and that without strong evidence to the contrary, we should assume this is the scenario we are in): “Anthropic’s role will be to provide as much evidence as possible that AI safety techniques cannot prevent serious or catastrophic safety risks from advanced AI, and to sound the alarm so that the world’s institutions can channel collective effort towards preventing the development of dangerous AIs. If we’re in a “near-pessimistic” scenario, this could instead involve channeling our collective efforts towards AI safety research and halting AI progress in the meantime. Indications that we are in a pessimistic or near-pessimistic scenario may be sudden and hard to spot. We should therefore always act under the assumption that we still may be in such a scenario unless we have sufficient evidence that we are not.” There have been more recent articulations of this version of Anthropic, for instance in Dario’s recent essay warning: “We must slow the pace at which we improve the capabilities of AI models… it’s my worry that in 6–12 months such a swarm could be capable of taking over the entire internet with a persistent botnet… incidents have happened across the industry, including at Anthropic, and I believe it’s incumbent on every frontier AI company to act as if OAI-HF had happened to them… more intelligent models are more capable of deceiving tests, and thus may appear aligned while having serious problems that go undetected…” A third view is that Anthropic exists not as a normal profit motivated company, or an AI safety organization seeking to help raise the alarm and solve collective action problems associated with AI development, but instead as an organization primarily concerned with creating superhuman AI capabilities before anyone else, in particular through creating a process whereby the current generation of Anthropic’s AI systems can autonomously build their successors, and those successors build their successors, and so on. The motivations for wanting to win this race may be manifold - maybe for the pure profit of Answer 1, but perhaps also because Anthropic believes that the best way to make the world better is for them to win this race instead of their more reckless colleagues; or, because of normal human pride and ambition. But the results (and risks, which Anthropic claims existentially threaten every single human being on earth) are the same. Anthropic employees and leaders may seek to answer this question on what Anthropic is by introspecting on their own intentions and those of their colleagues. But those of us outside the organization have more limited tools available to us - we can only see what Anthropic and its employees say and do, not how it feels or looks on the inside. When I look at many notable actions that Anthropic has taken over the past year, that evidence seems most consistent to me with the view that Anthropic is primarily trying to win the race to super intelligence, and that other considerations (including safety) are fundamentally secondary. These actions include: 1. Announced plans to build an in-house custom silicon chip team to accelerate the inference speeds that Claude operates at. 2. Inked deals for more than $500 billion in compute (according to the Information) to further accelerate AI development. 3. Increased the percentage of AI development tasks that Claude “leads” from 0% in March of this year to 26% August (what is it in October?) 4. Spent a massive percent of compute on internal AI R&D to accelerate development, including use of internal models far better than are available to the public. 5. Switched to Responsible Scaling Policy V3, which abandons its unilateral commitments to slow or stop development if Anthropic is unable to provide sufficient risk assurance. 6. Was the first company to create an alternative weaker “frontier compliance framework” to supplement its RSP, which contains no binding provisions whatsoever on internal deployments. 7. Wrote a letter to Congress (that it later walked back) saying that incidents where Claude was hacking random people were “best understood as a consequence of the misconfiguration, rather than evidence of misaligned goals.” 8. Commented “you can’t do safety from second place,” after the WH SI Accords. 9. Shared a draft bill to Congress that would preempt significant parts of state law (including with language that appears intended to prevent states from blocking dangerous AI deployments), and replace it with federal rules that (despite also containing good provisions) seems to create an enormously high bar for the executive branch to block development or deployment of Anthropic or another AI companies systems. Of course, this is a deliberately one sided list. Anthropic also published important AI safety research, advanced novel collaborations with third party AI safety organizations, and forcefully spoke out on the importance of AI safety in many public fora (or in private , where I realize a lot of the most valuable work is done and may not be visible to me or those outside the organization). But I think it’s worth sitting with how the above list looks to someone outside the company. The sense I have is that for those within the company, many of the items above are treated as anomalies or mistakes that don’t reflect who Anthropic really is. But I have every confidence that if employees at Anthropic saw one of their competitors (e.g. at OpenAI) take some of these actions, they would take it as confirmation of all their worst suspicions. (They might even call OpenAI employees a little gullible for accepting their leadership’s explanations for this behavior at face value.) Perhaps these were mistakes in the sense that they are not decisions that Anthropic leadership would endorse, but the actions still happened because of incentives and decisions that Anthropic leadership is ultimately responsible for (and would not accept similar excuses from another organization). When Anthropic strays and makes mistakes, why do the mistakes systematically tend to guard and favor Anthropic’s interests? For every provision that was too weak or a giveaway to AI companies in this legislation, why wasn’t there a mistake pushing in the direction of being too strong? A core part of Anthropic’s theory of change is that being at the frontier gives you more leverage to advocate for stricter policy. I think that conceptually makes sense, but in practice I’ve seen Anthropic push the frontier without substantially pushing the ‘safety frontier’ a remotely equivalent amount. I want to end by quoting from Anthropic co-founder Chris Olah’s comments around the Magnifica Humanitas release: “Every frontier AI lab—including Anthropic—operates inside a set of incentives and constraints that can sometimes conflict with doing the right thing. The pressure to stay commercially viable and to stay at the research frontier. Geopolitical pressure. And the older, plainer pressures of pride and ambition. No matter how sincerely any of us intend to do the right thing—and I believe many of us do—we will always be influenced by those incentives. That is why, if we want this technology to go well, it is enormously important that there be people outside those incentives—people who care about things going well and insist on safety, who are paying close attention, who are willing to say hard things, who are willing to be our earnest, thoughtful critics.” I hope these remarks are taken in that constructive spirit, and not as an attack on anyone specific at the organization (certainly not you Anthony, who I have only personally seen act professionally and thoughtfully, and who only ended up getting this diatribe in your replies for random contingent reasons).

  2. Rohan Paul69

    Anthropic 在科学博客发布 Claude 设计蝎子神经毒素蛋白结合剂的研究,Rohan Paul 转述称 Claude 在 Claude Science 环境中作为智能体自主完成整个蛋白设计流程:选择毒素攻击位点、驱动 12 个蛋白设计程序、自设评分阈值。

    引用Anthropic@AnthropicAI

    New on our Science Blog: designing protein binders against scorpion neurotoxins. Scorpions sting about 1.2m people every year, and antivenoms are often costly or in short supply. Claude has made an early step toward finding new treatments. https://www.anthropic.com/research/claude-scorpion-toxin-binder-design

  3. The Decoder:AI News57

    Sam Altman 内部提出三种 AI 安全终局方案,其中一种由单一公司掌控算力

    据 The Information 报道,OpenAI CEO Sam Altman 上周在内部向员工提出三种 AI 安全路径:仿照 IAEA 设立国际机构监督审计算力与能耗、仿照 Hassabis 的 CERN 设想把主要实验室合并为单一实体、以及极端情况下由开发者囤积算力甚至关停他人算力的 "Eliezer Plan"。

10月20日周二
  1. METR:Blog69

    METR 评测 Anthropic 2026 年 8 月风险报告对齐章节,认可低风险结论但质疑评估方法

    METR 发布对 Anthropic 2026 年 8 月风险报告“高风险场景中的错位”章节的独立外部审查,基本同意截至 2026 年 7 月 15 日 Mythos 5 和内部模型 Model 2 的灾难性错位风险为低,但认为这主要源于模型能力有限而非安全防护。

    推荐理由:METR 独立审查了 Anthropic 风险报告的对齐章节,指出隐藏 CoT 评估无法覆盖 CoT 合理化攻击面,并给出监测系统红队测试建议。

  2. Anthropic:Research74

    Anthropic 用 Claude 设计出针对蝎子神经毒素的蛋白质迷你结合剂

    Anthropic 让内部研究模型在 Claude Science 中主要自主运行 64 小时,设计针对五种蝎子神经毒素的蛋白质迷你结合剂,共生成 318,484 个设计、筛选出 180 个。

    推荐理由:原文完整披露设计流程、筛选标准和实验数据,读者可以了解 AI 驱动蛋白质设计在被忽视疾病上的真实进展与局限。

  3. 🚨 AI News | TestingCatalog38

    OpenAI的ChatGPT Slides现支持Pro、Business和Enterprise计划的实时协作编辑、评论与幻灯片内编辑,微软代码更新中短暂出现未公布的GPT-6.1 Terra模型后回滚。

    引用🚨 AI News | TestingCatalog@testingcatalog

    DAILY AI BRIEF 🗞 — Oct 19 OPENAI 🔥: - OpenAI is testing new "Aurora" image models on Arena after aurora-red, green and blue alpha references briefly appeared in its API. - The Codex desktop app now lets you edit previous messages within a thread. - Replit has made OpenAI its default model provider over Anthropic. ANTHROPIC 🔥: - Anthropic is committing 5% of its shares to the new Anthropic Public Benefit Fund. - Claude Fable 5.5 is reportedly preparing for the launch, with traces found in Azure, third-party tools, and partner testing. - Claude is preparing a Personal Finance feature, formerly codenamed "Claude Money", that analyzes bank data through Plaid and builds dashboards. NVIDIA 🔥: - NVIDIA GTC Berlin runs Oct 20–22, with Jensen Huang's keynote at the Tempodrom on Oct 21. MINIMAX 🔥: - MiniMax teased the upcoming MiniMax-M3.1-Flash. It is now being rolled out on the APIs. OPENCODE 🔥: - OpenCode said a distillation attack drained the OpenAI, Anthropic, and Google API balances of about 1.4% of its users. * Used Grok to compose this brief, cherry-picking the news and doing some post-editing.

  4. IT之家·人工智能43

    思科总裁用 AI 智能体盘点并取消无用订阅,一年省下上千美元

    思科总裁兼产品主管吉图・帕特尔用个人 AI 智能体扫描邮箱后发现,自己每年各类订阅总开销高达 9,000 美元,随后让智能体生成订阅清单并取消两项不需要的服务,每年省下 1,000 到 1,200 美元。该智能体每月订阅费 20 美元,还帮他取消了误开的每月 11.95 美元 Dropbox 套餐。他强调不应把未经企业审核的个人 AI 智能体接入工作工具与内部资源。